Monthly Archives: June 2012

Am I a compatibilist about free will?

Let me see. I can, for instance, think of the following example. Somebody tells me that I am an automaton and all the things I will do in the future are already written in a book. Suppose, in addition, that I am presented with conclusive evidence, so that I start to believe what I am told.

Even in this case, I would not be able to give up considering myself responsible (morally or otherwise) for my actions. (Were I made by this example to stop considering myself responsible for my actions, it would not be as if I was convinced by an argument – that would be something happening to me.)

So I cannot stop considering myself responsible for my actions, even if my actions, regarded as natural events, would be described by determinist laws, could be predicted entirely by someone else a.s.o.

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