Monthly Archives: April 2014

Force Fictionalism – Morals from Speech Act Theory

I gave a talk on this topic at Fictionalism. The Bucharest-Budapest Workshop in Philosophy, a few days ago. My slides are here. A first draft of my paper is here. Some of the notes I have made while working can be read here (although they will not make much sense by themselves).

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A passing remark about belief attribution

Let us start with the following simple scheme of belief attribution:

Agent G does action A.
Belief B is a reason for doing A.
—-
Therefore, A believes B.

To take an example, suppose George eats a sandwich. A reason for doing so would be provided by the belief that sandwiches are nutritious, so we could attribute that belief to George.

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