Here it is:
You can read a bit more about it here (also in Romanian). In short, the book is meant to be used primarily by students taking an Introduction to philosophy course in order to develop their “conceptual tweaking” (or “conceptual hacking”) abilities by trying to solve several philosophical puzzles, organized by different topics. The book is in a way similar to 101 Philosophy Problems, which inspired me to undertake such an academic project.
This is mainly an (yet unsuccessful) attempt to develop what I understood as a Wittgensteinean suggestion here for how we could justify claims of the form ‘I know that p’, where p describes what is happening in the speaker’s environment, by performing certain empirical actions. Since these are my personal notes, some other thoughts are intermixed. If you have any feedback, please leave a comment bellow.
Continue reading Empirical actions (and some other things)
We are more inclined to say that a particular work of art has artistic value (and no other work of art, no matter how similar, could have the same value) and less inclined to say of a particular action that it has a moral value in itself, as a particular action. A kind of action has a moral value. Moral values are linked to generalizations in a way artistic values are not. Is there any justification for this?