Also from last year (see previous post).
Some notes written about one year ago. I did revise them, but nothing is publishable.
This is mainly an (yet unsuccessful) attempt to develop what I understood as a Wittgensteinean suggestion here for how we could justify claims of the form ‘I know that p’, where p describes what is happening in the speaker’s environment, by performing certain empirical actions. Since these are my personal notes, some other thoughts are intermixed. If you have any feedback, please leave a comment bellow.
Cateva ganduri din ultima luna de zile. Nimic publicabil.
Las aici însemnările pe care le-am făcut în vara asta la mare, fiindcă aşa mi-ar fi mai la îndemână să le revăd mai târziu. Nu consider că au vreo valoare intelectuală.
Let us start with the following simple scheme of belief attribution:
Agent G does action A.
Belief B is a reason for doing A.
Therefore, A believes B.
To take an example, suppose George eats a sandwich. A reason for doing so would be provided by the belief that sandwiches are nutritious, so we could attribute that belief to George.
Le voi transcrie aici, fiindca imi e mai usor sa le adun la un loc in felul acesta. Ca de obicei, nimic din ce e aici nu mi se pare publicabil.