Some notes written about one year ago. I did revise them, but nothing is publishable.
This is mainly an (yet unsuccessful) attempt to develop what I understood as a Wittgensteinean suggestion here for how we could justify claims of the form ‘I know that p’, where p describes what is happening in the speaker’s environment, by performing certain empirical actions. Since these are my personal notes, some other thoughts are intermixed. If you have any feedback, please leave a comment bellow.
These are some notes which I wrote down in the last few months. I was thinking of writing a book, so I wrote in order to make the topic of my book a bit more clear. This is the only use of this text – to make it clear for myself what I am supposed to write about in my book. The only result of writing everything found here, which I would acknowledge, is that the title of my book should be ‘Reason, Language and Actions’. Nothing else should be taken seriously, nothing is worth mentioning etc. I did not proofread the text for grammar mistakes. If you want to take a look at it, you’re on your own.
Las aici însemnările pe care le-am făcut în vara asta la mare, fiindcă aşa mi-ar fi mai la îndemână să le revăd mai târziu. Nu consider că au vreo valoare intelectuală.
I gave a talk on this topic at Fictionalism. The Bucharest-Budapest Workshop in Philosophy, a few days ago. My slides are here. A first draft of my paper is here. Some of the notes I have made while working can be read here (although they will not make much sense by themselves).
One might say that in the beginning of Meaning, Grice tries to distinguish between two different vocabularies – the naturalistic and the non-naturalistic one, given the fact that “to mean” figures in both of them. Also, in doing so, he attempts to use a neutral vocabulary, apparently.
Continue reading Natural and Nonnatural Meaning