Category Archives: probleme

Reason, Actions, Nature

These are some notes which I wrote down in the last few months. I was thinking of writing a book, so I wrote in order to make the topic of my book a bit more clear. This is the only use of this text – to make it clear for myself what I am supposed to write about in my book. The only result of writing everything found here, which I would acknowledge, is that the title of my book should be ‘Reason, Language and Actions’. Nothing else should be taken seriously, nothing is worth mentioning etc. I did not proofread the text for grammar mistakes. If you want to take a look at it, you’re on your own.

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Three Drawings

I’ve done the first one in an attempt to clarify my view of philosophy as a conceptual proposal:


The second expresses my thoughts about the dual nature of actions:


In the third case I was trying to think of the different ways in which we understand the idea if necessity:


They are related.

A passing remark about belief attribution

Let us start with the following simple scheme of belief attribution:

Agent G does action A.
Belief B is a reason for doing A.
Therefore, A believes B.

To take an example, suppose George eats a sandwich. A reason for doing so would be provided by the belief that sandwiches are nutritious, so we could attribute that belief to George.

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In continuare despre responsabilitate

Si totusi, pentru a spune ca ma bazez pe X intr-o anumita situatie, sau ca am incredere ca X va face A, nu e suficient ca X sa fie responsabil pentru a face A (sau ceea ce ma astept sa faca in situatia respectiva). Exista, de pilda, parinti iresponsabili. Ei au responsabilitatea sa faca anumite lucruri, dar nu le fac. Cand spun ca ei sunt iresponsabili nu ii absolv de responsabilitatile pe care le au, ca parinti, ci doar observ ca sunt incapabili sa le indeplineasca.

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Continuarea postului precedent

In ce sens poate fi o greseala morala inevitabila? Pana la urma, e vorba fie despre o actiune pe care eu o realizez, fie despre una pe care aleg sa nu o realizez (desi ar fi trebuit sa o fac). Trebuie sa existe loc pentru o alegere, pentru cursuri de actiune alternative. Altfel, cum se mai poate vorbi despre responsabilitate?

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